When the U.S. invaded Iraq in 2003, Blackwater was at the vanguard, providing a useful shadow to the Army. Sensitive operations to which the U.S. did not want to officially give its name were invariably assigned to Blackwater, and with steady dollars from the U.S. Treasury flowing in, it expanded into a formidable organization, at one point having as many as 50,000 soldiers in Iraq.

The U.S. government had been secretive about Blackwater’s role in the war on terror from the start, and its name might still be unknown had it not been for events in Nisour Square during late 2007. On Sept. 16, 2007, a group of Blackwater soldiers shot and killed 17 Iraqi civilians. This sort of thing had likely been occurring for some time, but Blackwater soon found its name plastered across headlines and thrust to the forefront of national discussion. Senators and newspapers demanded some sort of accountability system for our non-regular forces — something that has not yet happened — and more importantly, real questions were asked as to the role extra-military soldiers should play in our foreign affairs.

Since then, such questions have largely fallen silent; they had all but disappeared by the time the presidential election campaigns began. Curiously, for all of the ugly press that surrounded Blackwater at the time, its business has not decreased. To the contrary, they changed their name from Blackwater USA to Blackwater Worldwide, an umbrella corporation with services ranging from intelligence to experimental technology; from training soldiers to laying siege to a city.

The extent to which we rely on Blackwater and similar organizations is quite considerable. It is reported that approximately 70 percent of the U.S. intelligence budget is spent on third-party agencies, and Blackwater itself has been contracted for innumerable tasks around the world. These soldiers represent a new kind of war; never before have extra-military forces been so extensively used in U.S. operations, and the concept itself is so new that there is very little legal precedent. As such, their actions have gone largely unchallenged. With the legal framework for prosecutions still not in place, third-party soldiers are still able to operate with near-impunity.

In an age where a U.S soldier must go without body armor while his private counterpart is armed with state-of-the-art equipment, the real issues about what this portends for our country have gone largely unanswered. Machiavelli was not mistaken when he warned against the unpredictability of soldiers-for-hire.

There are further problems corporations like Blackwater present, such as the disproportionate salary private soldiers receive compared to U.S infantry, but they pale in comparison to the sheer lawlessness created by a private army who answers to no power.

Pavan Vangipuram is a State News columnist. Reach him at vangipu1@msu.edu .