The book is not a literary masterpiece, but it is valuable for being one of the first such studies conducted with a semblance of the scientific method. Instead of focusing on individual cases, Sageman compiles a database of more than 200 terrorists from police records and extensive interviews. Throughout the book, he attempts to answer questions such as, “Who becomes a terrorist and how does the process occur?”

Though he limits his study to Islamic terrorism and neglects suicide bombers in favor of group leaders, Sageman comes to some very definite conclusions about the causes of terrorism, many of which defy conventional wisdom.

The first, and most interesting, is a refutation of the popular idea of a terrorist. According to Sageman, a terrorist is not likely to be poor, uneducated or intensely religious. He found 61 percent of his sample to be college graduates, predominantly in technical fields such as science and engineering (Osama Bin Laden himself was a civil engineer).

In terms of socioeconomic background, the terrorists studied were overwhelmingly middle class, often born to parents who had moved to the West and found a comfortable life. And in regard to religiosity, only 20 percent had religious education from childhood, while more than two-thirds had a secular upbringing. Why, then, do people become terrorists?

The path to extremism is slow and nuanced, according to Sageman’s book, and relies heavily on what he calls “group polarization.” It begins with a feeling of moral outrage. Though such claims are regularly denied by American politicians, there is a widespread belief that the United States and Europe are waging a “war on Islam.”

The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are considered proof of this, and other actions by the West, such as the Bosnia campaign, were similarly regarded in the past. Many young Muslims who travel to the West as students become preoccupied by this perceived war and deeply resentful of their host societies.

After a period of brooding, the fledgling terrorist seeks out sympathizers. Often this is done out of sheer loneliness. Sageman finds that 60 percent of his sample adopted extremism while living in a country where they did not grow up. They feel as though there is some vast injustice being done to Islam in the name of democracy, and during their isolation, they begin to consort with a tight group of people who share that view.

From that point, group polarization takes over. As the group becomes closer, the tendency is to adopt more and more extreme attitudes. This occurs because each member of the group has an idea of what he thinks the group wants him to say. The dynamic fuels a feedback loop, wherein the discussion spontaneously evolves from: “There is a great injustice being committed” to “We have to do something about this” to “We need to do something now.”

These pockets of malcontents (“bunches of guys,” as Sageman calls them) form the real backbone of the jihadist movement. Al-Qaida and other major organizations are only on the sideline.

This is a departure from the conventional paradigm of terrorism, and Sageman presents a new policy to address it. He comes very close to rejecting a military solution — with the familiar argument that every terrorist killed spawns many times more.

Instead, he asserts, it is the feeling of injustice that must be attacked, either through propaganda, a more cautious military policy or both.

These conclusions are unlikely to be popular with our policy-makers, who have staked their careers on the idea that terror can be contained through military force.

But they are valuable for bringing to light a point that is not often discussed: People are not born terrorists, they become terrorists.

Pavan Vangipuram is a State News columnist and chemical engineering senior. Reach him at vangipu1@msu.edu.