It is difficult to recreate the political atmosphere of 2002, but here are a few background events to color the picture. The nation was still reeling from the shock of the Sept. 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. A recalcitrant Afghan government had refused to surrender Osama bin Laden — forcing the U.S. to go to war. We found an extensive al-Qaida network there, but bin Laden was nowhere to be seen. The Taliban had morphed into a guerilla group and was constantly attacking our soldiers. Meanwhile, the ever-present threat of another terrorist attack shaded every news report.

During this time, several links were made between Saddam and al-Qaida. It seemed perfectly plausible; Hussein had no love for the U.S. and should have been thirsty for revenge after Kuwait. Furthermore, he had the luxury of a structured government and the potential to cause far more damage than a ragtag group of terrorists. Hussein was accused of consorting with terrorist groups in addition to having a clandestine nuclear program. The evidence came from sources who should have been reliable, and the dissenting voices were faint for fear of being labeled “unpatriotic.” Evidence has since come to light that strongly suggests the entire affair was fabricated.

There also was a humanistic element to it. The Iraqis had been crushed under the heel of totalitarianism for 30 years, and the events of 1991 laid Hussein’s brutality bare for all to see. And soon it was clear Hussein was a petty dictator desperately clinging to power. As the self-proclaimed guardian of democracy, the U.S. had a unique opportunity to plant its flower in the arid desert. But we didn’t take into consideration the cultural situation of Iraq. Up to 2006, there were senators confessing not to know the difference between a Shia and a Sunni. Democracy is the fruit of centuries of change and reform; it does not spring overnight, and there is no such thing as an easy transition.

And there was always the trophy of oil. As the reasons for going to war become more and more cloudy, this is the one that makes the most sense. The government has consistently denied this, but the signs were present from day one. Iraq was originally sold as a quick, blitzkrieg-style war, lasting six months at the most. We were always told that the war would pay for itself.

It was argued we would have a permanent oil-producing ally that would be delighted to sell it cheap. It was this tantalizing prospect that gained the tacit approval of the Republican Party’s corporate base. Even those who had no illusions about the real intentions of the war were pacified. That scenario, of course, never came to fruition. Iraqi oil output is now a mere fraction of what it was under Hussein, and the war’s balance stands at $1 trillion with more predicted.

The fallacies behind the reasons we were given for the war were evident from the start, but a clever propaganda campaign shot them into the background. We were constantly inundated with news reports describing the extent of Hussein’s arsenal and his ties with terrorist organizations. Anyone who suggested otherwise was labeled a traitor and vilified. In the same breath, war was portrayed as a noble thing and the invasion of Iraq as a righteous goal.

We must examine the government’s deception because nearly the same argument is currently being used to justify an invasion of Iran. Five years of war made the public skeptical but not entirely unbelieving. If we do not study how we were fooled the first time, it is liable to happen again.

Pavan Vangipuram is a State News columnist and a chemical engineering junior. Reach him at vanpu1@msu.edu.